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STATE DEBTS &
FEDERAL JURISDICTION
JOHN V. ORTH*

For dryness and technicality no subject can rival public finance,
1
except perhaps federal jurisdiction.
It is perhaps fitting to begin an article on sovereign debtors and
their creditors with Ebenezer Scrooge, “a squeezing, wrenching,
2
grasping, scraping, clutching, covetous old sinner.” On a certain
Christmas Eve in the early 1840s, the miser was visited by the ghost of
his former business partner, Jacob Marley, dragging a chain made of
“cash-boxes, keys, padlocks, ledgers, deeds, and heavy purses wrought
3
in steel.” Hoping to help Scrooge free himself from similar bondage,
Marley announced that he had arranged for Scrooge to be haunted by
three spirits. Although the old sinner fell asleep well after midnight,
he was awakened by the sound of midnight chimes. At first, Scrooge
feared that he had slept through a day on which the sun had failed to
rise and that his time-sensitive securities had become worthless. When
he realized that the city was not gripped by panic and that it was still
the night of the same day, he heaved a great sigh of relief “because
‘three days after sight of this First of Exchange pay to Mr. Ebenezer
Scrooge or his order,’ and so forth, would have become a mere United

* William Rand Kenan, Jr., Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. A.B.
1969, Oberlin College; J.D. 1974, M.A. 1975, Ph.D. (history) 1977, Harvard University.
1. JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY viii (1987).
2. CHARLES DICKENS, A CHRISTMAS CAROL 8 (New Oxford Illustrated Dickens 1954)
(1843).
3. Id. at 17.
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States’ security if there were no days to count by.”
Due to the reckless financiering that ended in the Panic of 1837
and the ensuing default by a number of American states, American
government debt had become a byword for worthlessness. What we
today would recognize as a true “United States’ security”—a treasury
bill or note backed by the full faith and credit of the federal
government—had not become worthless. Indeed after 1835, when the
federal government paid off the first national debt in full, such truly
federal securities no longer existed. Scrooge (and many Englishmen
with him) had failed to understand the structure of American
government and public finance and had confused Pennsylvania and
other state bonds with federal obligations. Just as the introduction of
the Euro in 1999 led investors to believe that the shared currency
made the debts of Europe’s peripheral economies just as safe as
German bunds, so English investors a hundred and sixty years earlier
had mispriced the various American state debts. There are no
Eurobonds (yet), so a modern equivalent to Scrooge’s metaphor
would be as if Scrooge had called Greek bonds “a mere European
security”—likening junk to what would presumably be (if it existed) a
triple-A rated obligation.
State bonds are not “fiat money,” as economists use that term, but
they share at least one characteristic with unsecured paper currency:
they depend for their legal value on judicial power to enforce them.
Would American courts enforce the bonds of the defaulting American
states? That was the question English investors asked their lawyers.
State courts were an unpromising venue because of the recognized
power of states to invoke sovereign immunity and close their own
courts to suitors. Ironically, one of the indebted states did allow suits
against itself. Mississippi allowed suit, a case was duly brought, and
5
the plaintiffs won. But the judgment went unsatisfied, and one of the
4. Id. at 23. At the time, bills of exchange were “prepared in three sets as the first,
second, and third exchange, so that if one was lost, the others would be available, and once one
[was] accepted the others [became] worthless.” CHARLES DICKENS, THE ANNOTATED
CHRISTMAS CAROL 84 (Michael Patrick Hearn ed. 1976). Dickens had alluded to the subject of
American repudiation in his travelogue, AMERICAN NOTES, published in 1842, and returned to
the subject several times in MARTIN CHUZZLEWIT, a long novel that was being published in
serial form at the same time as the publication of A CHRISTMAS CAROL. CHARLES DICKENS,
AMERICAN NOTES 245–46 (New Oxford Illustrated Dickens 1957) (1842); CHARLES DICKENS,
THE LIFE AND ADVENTURES OF MARTIN CHUZZLEWIT 374, 531, 537 (New Oxford Illustrated
Dickens 1951) (1843–44).
5. See generally State v. Johnson, 25 Miss. 625 (1853) (holding that under the constitution
and laws of Mississippi a bondholder could sue the state and recover the amount of principal
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judges was defeated at the next election.
I.

3

6

THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT: THE EARLY YEARS

The availability of federal courts to enforce state bonds depended
on the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Adopted in
1795 to overturn an earlier Supreme Court decision holding that
federal courts had jurisdiction over a suit to collect a state debt
7
brought by a citizen of another state, the Amendment was a response
to fear that domestic and foreign creditors could invoke federal
8
jurisdiction to enforce state obligations. The Eleventh Amendment
neatly eliminated that risk: “The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, [and then added for good measure] or by
9
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” Bond-holding British
subjects appeared to be shut out.

and interest of the bond).
6. REGINALD MCGRANE, FOREIGN BONDHOLDERS AND AMERICAN STATE DEBTS 218
(Beard Books 2000). Mississippi was the first state to provide for the popular election of all its
judges. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 127 (2d ed. 1986); see MISS.
CONST. of 1832, art. IV, § 2 (“The high court of errors and appeals shall consist of three judges,
any two of whom shall form a quorum. The legislature shall divide the State into three districts,
and the qualified electors of each district shall elect one of the said judges for the term of six
years.”).
7. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 425 (1793). As adopted in 1789, the Constitution
gives the Supreme Court jurisdiction over “[c]ontroversies . . . between a State and citizens of
another State.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Chisholm was heard in the Court’s original
jurisdiction. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“In all Cases . . . in which a State shall be Party,
the Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.”). Officially recognized by presidential
proclamation as part of the Constitution on January 8, 1798, the date traditionally given for its
adoption, the Eleventh Amendment had in fact received the necessary number of state
ratifications by February 7, 1795.
8. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406–07 (1821) (“It is part of our
history, that, at the adoption of the constitution, all the States were greatly indebted; and the
apprehension that these debts might be prosecuted in the federal Courts, formed a very serious
objection to that instrument. Suits were instituted; and the Court maintained its jurisdiction.
The alarm was general; and, to quiet the apprehensions that were so extensively entertained,
this amendment was proposed in Congress, and adopted by the State legislatures.”); see also
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 750 (1999) (“It is indisputable that, at the time of the founding,
many of the States could have been forced into insolvency but for their immunity from private
suits for money damages.”).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. For an argument that the Eleventh Amendment is a judicial
decision in the form of a constitutional amendment, see John V. Orth, The Judicial Amendment,
37 J. SUP. CT. HIST. (forthcoming 2012).
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Viewed through the gimlet eye of a litigator, however, the wording
of the Amendment suggested interesting possibilities. Although it
closed the federal courthouse door to suits against states by two
classes of plaintiffs—citizens of a state other than the defendant state
and citizens (or subjects) of foreign states—it did not exhaust the
universe of potential suitors. The obvious lacuna in the Amendment
was a suit by a citizen of the debtor state. If citizens could use the
federal courts to collect from their own state, it would establish a
market for the bonds and give foreign bondholders leverage in
10
negotiations with the debtor state. The Supreme Court closed this
loophole in a decision that recognized a federal right to state
11
sovereign immunity in such a case —but not until 1890, when another
wave of state defaults after the Civil War and another financial panic
generated the mushroom growth of Eleventh Amendment
12
jurisprudence.
Another possibility was suit by a foreign state itself (as opposed to
its citizens or subjects). In 1844, the year after the publication of
Dickens’s A CHRISTMAS CAROL, the prominent Massachusetts
lawyer, Benjamin Curtis (later a U.S. Supreme Court Justice), acting
on behalf of Baring Brothers, published an anonymous article in the
13
influential North American Review suggesting just such a strategy.
Sovereigns have always taken an interest in the security of their
citizens’ foreign investments, sometimes forcibly. Sending the
gunboats was out of the question in this case, but sending the lawyers
might have been possible. This suggestion too was acted upon—but

10. Cf. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 122 n.17 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[N]othing
in the treaty [of Paris, 1783] would have prevented foreign creditors from selling their debt
instruments (thereby assigning their claims) to citizens of the debtor State.”). The Assignee
Clause of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 excluded from the diversity jurisdiction of lower
federal courts “any suit to recover the contents of any promissory note or other chose in action
in favour of an assignee, unless a suit might have been prosecuted in such courts to recover the
said contents if no assignment had been made.” Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1
Stat. 73, 79. After the Civil War, the Supreme Court held that the clause was not applicable to
securities like bearer bonds that pass by delivery, not assignment. See, e.g., Thomson v. Lee
County, 70 U.S. 327 (1866) (holding that if a state court construes its laws and constitution to
give the bonds force and vitality, the Supreme Court cannot destroy them by a subsequent and
contrary construction).
11. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
12. See ORTH, supra note 1, at 58–109 (describing the history of Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence).
13. Benjamin R. Curtis, Debts of the American States, 58 N. AM. REV. 109 (1844). Notably,
John Marshall had pointed the way in dicta more than twenty years earlier. Cohens, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) at 406 (explaining that the Eleventh Amendment “does not comprehend
controversies . . . between a State and a foreign State”).
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not for another hundred years. In 1934, the Principality of Monaco
sued Mississippi in the Supreme Court on its defaulted 1830s bonds
14
with no greater success than in the case of the in-state plaintiff.
Yet another possibility was assignment to an American state (as
15
opposed to its citizens) for collection. This was tried—also many
16
years later—but met with only mixed success. The one surefire
17
winner would have been suit by the United States government.
Whether efforts were made in this direction in the 1840s is unknown.
There might have been reason to hope: the reputational damage to
American credit by the state defaults affected even the federal fisc,
which was denied the possibility of a foreign loan in 1842. “Not a
18
dollar,” said Baron Rothschild to the Treasury’s agent. Political
constraints imposed by sectionalism probably made federal action
19
infeasible.
It was also possible to approach the problem from the other end,
so to speak. Rather than trying to find the right plaintiff, why not try a
different defendant? Rather than sue the state itself, why not sue a
state officer—say, the state auditor—to compel payment? The
Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Marshall had allowed just
such a strategy in a suit by the Bank of the United States to recover
20
an unconstitutional state tax collected on one of its branches. “[I]n
all cases where jurisdiction depends on the party,” said the Chief
21
Justice, “it is the party named in the record.” A state officer is not a

14. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
15. Again, John Marshall had signposted the way. See Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 406
(explaining that the Eleventh Amendment “does not comprehend controversies between two or
more States”).
16. See South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904) (asserting jurisdiction and
distinguishing New Hampshire v. Lousiana on the ground that New Hampshire had bare legal
title, while South Dakota was asserting its own beneficial ownership); New Hampshire v.
Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883) (denying jurisdiction); see also Virginia v. West Virginia, 206 U.S.
290 (1907) (asserting jurisdiction over the dispute concerning the two states’ liabilities for their
respective portions of the antebellum Virginia state debt).
17. See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892) (involving a suit by the United
States to determine the boundary between U.S. land and land belonging to Texas); United
States v. North Carolina, 136 U.S. 211 (1890) (involving a suit by the United States against
North Carolina to recover interest on bonds issued by the state).
18. Letter from Duff Green to John C. Calhoun (Jan. 24, 1842), reprinted in 2 AM. HIST.
ASS’N REP. 841, 842 (1899); see also REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER SENT TO EUROPE TO
NEGOTIATE A LOAN, H.R. DOC. NO. 27-197 (3d Sess. 1843).
19. For a discussion, see Michael S. Greve, Our Federalism is Not Europe’s. It’s Becoming
Argentina’s., 7 DUKE J. CONST. LAW & PUB. POL’Y 17 (2012).
20. Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. 738 (1824).
21. Id. at 857.

(6) KEYNOTE - ORTH (DO NOT DELETE)

6

8/20/2012 1:23 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 7:1

state. A suit against a state officer is, therefore, not a suit against a
state. Q.E.D. Years later, bondholders tried this route around the
Eleventh Amendment, at first with promising results. But finally this,
22
too, turned out to be a dead end.
However many of these legal strategies the state creditors
considered in the 1840s, the one thing they did not consider was to sue
the debtor states in federal court. Accordingly, the exact bearing of
the Eleventh Amendment on American state debt was left
undetermined for decades. In fact, also left open was the question to
what extent state debts were properly sovereign debts at all
(assuming, that is, that a defining characteristic of sovereign debts is
23
their uncollectibility by ordinary legal means). In the 1840s, the
creditors’ legal situation was not unpromising. Chief Justice Marshall,
as we have seen, showed no enthusiasm for the Eleventh Amendment,
and Chief Justice Roger Taney never had to take a position on the
24
Amendment during his long tenure. Despite their many differences,
both men were firm believers in the reach of federal jurisdiction. Of
course, there are many reasons aggrieved parties decide not to litigate
other than doubts about jurisdiction: the cost in time and money
relative to the likelihood of recovery, their lawyers’ skill (or lack
thereof) in devising plausible legal arguments, and the chance for an
acceptable settlement. In the case of the creditors of the states in the
1840s, the reason seems to have been the prospect of settlements.
25
Many of the antebellum state debts were at least partially redeemed.

22. Compare Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. 203, 220 (1873) (allowing suit against a state governor,
holding that “[w]here the State is concerned, the State should be made a party, if it could be
done. That it cannot be done is a sufficient reason for the omission to do it, and the court may
proceed to decree against the officers of the State in all respects as if the State were a party to
the record.”), and Bd. of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531 (1876) (allowing suit against a
state board), with Louisiana ex rel. Elliott v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1883) (denying jurisdiction
over suit against a state auditor), and North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U.S. 22 (1890) (denying
jurisdiction over suit against a state auditor).
23. See William B. English, Understanding the Costs of Sovereign Default: American State
Debts in the 1840’s, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 259, 259 (1996) (“These debts are properly seen as
sovereign debts both because the United States Constitution precludes suits against states to
enforce the payment of debts, and because most of the state debts were held by residents of
other states and other countries (primarily Britain).”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 464
(Alexander Hamilton) (Forgotten Books 2008) (“The contracts between a nation and an
individual are only binding on the conscience of the sovereign, and have no pretensions to a
compulsive force. They confer no right of action, independent of the sovereign will.”).
24. See ORTH, supra note 1, at 42 (“The Amendment was cited in only five cases [during
Taney’s tenure as Chief Justice] and in none did the Court find itself ousted of jurisdiction.”).
25. See English, supra note 23, at 265 (outlining debts and outcomes in table 3).
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II. STATE DEBT IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY
When the next wave of American sovereign defaults hit the
capital markets in the 1880s, the disappointed bondholders launched a
vigorous campaign of litigation, perhaps because the prospect of
26
settlement seemed remote under the circumstances. The result was
scant recovery and a remarkable extension of Eleventh Amendment
immunity, important parts of which survived the later revanche of
27
federal power—indeed, survive to this day. By 1890, precedents had
accumulated barring suits to collect state debts brought against state
officers, against states by other states, and against states by their own
28
citizens.
The political realities of post-Reconstruction America are more
important than legal analysis in making sense of this sudden
efflorescence of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. To paraphrase
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, experience rather than logic was the
29
life of the Eleventh Amendment. It is the common coin of American
constitutional history that Supreme Court Justices in the latenineteenth century were unsurpassed in their zeal for freedom of
30
contract and the protection of property. Repudiation must have
stunk in their nostrils.
The cases in which the Court stretched the Eleventh Amendment
to prevent suits against states all involved suits against states of the
31
Old Confederacy, principally Louisiana and North Carolina. By the
time the litigation commenced, Reconstruction was over, the South
had recovered “home rule” (that is, rule by the indigenous white male
population), and the U.S. Army had been sent back to barracks. Just
as the President and Congress abandoned the newly freed slaves after
26. ORTH, supra note 1, at 53–55, 59–60, 63–66, and 90–92 (describing litigation in the
1880s).
27. See discussion infra notes 58–68 and accompanying text.
28. The rejection of suits by foreign sovereigns had to wait several more decades.
29. Cf. OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 5 (1881) (“The life of the law has not
been logic; it has been experience.”).
30. See generally ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW:
ATTITUDES OF BAR & BENCH, 1887–1895 (1960) (providing an historical account of legal
doctrines used by courts to preserve particular property rights and contractual obligations).
31. Lest there be any confusion, I should make clear that the repudiated bonds in question
were issued by the Confederate States of America or by its constituent states. The Fourteenth
Amendment made “any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against
the United States” illegal and void. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4. Instead, the bondholders
were trying to enforce bonds authorized by Reconstruction legislatures. See, e.g., Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 9 (1890). Or, in some cases, by antebellum legislatures. See, e.g., North
Carolina v. Temple, 134 U.S. 22 (1890).
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Reconstruction, so perforce the former slaves were abandoned by the
32
federal courts. Investors in Southern bonds were abandoned too—
and for the same reason. As the attorney general of Louisiana
candidly pointed out to the Supreme Court in 1890:
The solemn obligation of a government arising on its own
acknowledged bond would not be enhanced by a judgment
rendered on such bond. If it either could not or would not make
provision for paying the bond, it is probable that it could not or
33
would not make provision for satisfying the judgment.

Without the backing of the political branches, in other words, the
courts could not expect their judgments to be satisfied.
The difficulty with that simple solution was that Virginia—
arguably the most important state of the Old Confederacy—was
denied the shelter of the Eleventh Amendment. A study of the cases
shows that the difference resulted from a unique provision included in
the covenants of the Virginia bonds, rather than any inherent
difference in Virginia’s sovereign immunity: the coupons representing
the periodic interest payments were made “receivable at and after
34
maturity for all taxes, debts, dues, and demands due the state.” Again,
Chief Justice Marshall provided the clue. In an early case raising an
Eleventh Amendment claim, Chief Justice Marshall asked: “Were a
35
State to lay [an unconstitutional] duty on exports, to collect the
money and place it in her treasury, could the citizen who paid it . . .
maintain a suit in this Court against such a State, to recover back the
36
money?” Answering his question with a dubious “[p]erhaps not,” he
continued:

32. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883) (holding unconstitutional major
portions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875).
33. Brief on behalf of the State of Louisiana at 25, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)
(quoting Letter from Daniel Webster to Baring Bros. & Co. (Oct. 16, 1839), reprinted in THE
PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER: CORRESPONDENCE, VOL. 4: 1835–1839, at 407 (Charles M.
Wiltse & Howard D. Moser eds., 1980)). For a brief discussion of Webster’s rather confusing
opinion letter, see ORTH, supra note 1, at 43–44. It is one thing for a lawyer to advise a client
that a judgment debtor might refuse to pay; it is something else for a debtor’s advocate to tell a
court, as a reason not to issue a judgment in favor of the creditor, that such debtor might refuse
to pay.
34. Act of March 30, 1871, ch. 282, § 2, 1870–1871 Va. Acts 378, 379.
35. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 2 (“No State shall, without the Consent of the
Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely
necessary for executing its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid
by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States;
and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Control of the Congress.”).
36. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 402 (1821).
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Suppose a citizen to refuse to pay this export duty, and a suit to be
instituted for the purpose of compelling him to pay it. He pleads
the constitution of the United States in bar of the action,
notwithstanding which the [trial] Court gives judgment against
37
him. This would be a case arising under the constitution
38

—in other words, a justiciable case.
As applied to the Virginia coupons, this suggested a different legal
strategy. Rather than sue the state (or its officers) to compel payment,
a bondholder could tender matured coupons in satisfaction of state
taxes. To avoid its “solemn obligation,” the state would then have to
sue the taxpayer for taxes due and unpaid. Such a suit was quite
obviously not a suit against a state, and a judicial decision that the
taxes had been legally discharged would not require the court to
order the state to make “any provision for satisfying the judgment.”
Tender of payment by a debtor at a reasonable time and place and in
a reasonable manner is sufficient to satisfy a debt or obligation,
whether or not the creditor accepts the payment. In this case, the trial
court’s judgment would be self-executing. Taxes are paid when a court
of competent jurisdiction says they are. Ipse dixit. This strategy was
39
tried and, after much litigation, finally succeeded.
There was also another class of government debt that was not
exempted from federal jurisdiction. In the Midwest and West, cities
and counties had issued bonds or pledged their credit to encourage
railroad construction. In the same year that the Southern states
(except Virginia) got their quittance, the Supreme Court held that
municipal corporations were not alter egos of the state and were
40
therefore denied the shelter of the Eleventh Amendment. Quoting
Chief Justice Marshall, the Court smugly announced: “[T]he eleventh
37. Id. at 402–03. Marshall had posed the same hypothetical case almost twenty years
earlier in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179 (1803). See also Hans, 134 U.S. at 20–
21 (“Whilst a State cannot be compelled by suit to perform its contracts, any attempt on its part
to violate property or rights acquired under its contracts, may be judicially resisted, and any law
impairing the obligation of contracts under which such property or rights are held is void and
powerless to affect their enjoyment.”).
38. Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 383 (“[A] case arising under the constitution or laws of
the United States, is cognizable in the Courts of the Union, whoever may be the parties to that
case.”).
39. E.g., McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U.S. 662, 664–65 (1890); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 507–
08 (1887); Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269, 269–70 (1885); Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U.S.
769, 782 (1883); Hartman v. Greenhow, 102 U.S. 672, 685 (1881). For the colorful history of
Virginia’s determined effort to “readjust” its debt, including statutes commonly known as
“coupon killers,” see ORTH, supra note 1, 90–105.
40. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890).
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amendment, which restrains the jurisdiction granted by the
constitution over suits against states, is of necessity limited to those
41
suits in which the state is a party on the record.” Cities and counties
are not states, despite the fact that they derive all their powers—
including the power to borrow—from the state. This time, the political
branches showed their resolve to back up the courts. Ulysses S. Grant,
war hero and President, permitted the publication of a letter stating
that he would not hesitate to use force if necessary to see that county
42
debts were honored. In modern terminology, municipal debt is not
sovereign; it is subsovereign, which is merely another way of saying
that legal means are available to enforce payment. Today, of course,
the Federal Bankruptcy Code offers a mechanism for orderly
43
municipal defaults.
III. EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY APPROACHES
TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
As the problem of Southern state bonds receded into the past, the
Supreme Court began the slow process of withdrawing from a few of
its more extreme Eleventh Amendment positions. In 1904, a suit by
one state against another (and a Southern state at that) to collect on
44
defaulted bonds was allowed. In 1908, the most significant
retrenchment occurred. Distinguishing several of the bond cases, the
Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar suits against a
45
state officer to prevent violation of the Federal Constitution.
Although the Court found that unconstitutional state action was

41. Id. (quoting Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 857 (1824)); see also Bank
of U.S. v. Planters’ Bank of Ga., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 905–06 (1824) (holding that a statechartered bank is not an alter ego of the state and therefore not eligible to claim Eleventh
Amendment immunity). Although cities and counties are in fact organs of state government,
they are, in form, chartered corporations. Traditionally, corporations were divided into
“municipal corporations” and “corporations other than municipal.” E.g., N.C. CONST. of 1868,
arts. VII, VIII; see JOHN V. ORTH, THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION, 140–43
(1993).
42. Letter from Ulysses S. Grant to John A. Dix (June 20, 1870), reprinted in CHARLES
FAIRMAN, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION
AND REUNION 1864–88, PART ONE, at 985 (Paul A. Freund ed. 1971).
43. See Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Imp. Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513, 543 (1936) (“In the
public law of the United States a State is a sovereign or at least a quasi-sovereign. Not so, a local
governmental unit, although the State may have invested it with governmental power.”).
44. South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286, 313–14 (1904); see generally ROBERT F.
DURDEN, RECONSTRUCTION BONDS AND TWENTIETH CENTURY POLITICS: SOUTH DAKOTA V.
NORTH CAROLINA (1904) (1962) (recounting the political and legal controversy surrounding the
“South Dakota bond” case).
45. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908).
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threatened, it nonetheless held that the officer through whom the
state acted could not assert the state’s sovereign immunity. By
attempting to enforce an unconstitutional statute, the state officer is
“stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in
46
his person to the consequences of his individual conduct.” As the
Supreme Court itself later acknowledged, this holding had the ironical
result that a state officer’s conduct is state action for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment but not for purposes of the Eleventh
47
Amendment. Over the course of the twentieth century, that line has
wavered but held at the point that exceptions to Eleventh
Amendment immunity are permitted insofar as “necessary to permit
federal courts to vindicate federal rights and hold state officials
48
responsible to ‘the supreme authority of the United States.’”
IV. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN THE
LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY
In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the Eleventh
Amendment again emerged from obscurity as an activist federal
government encountered state concern about liability, and Supreme
Court Justices representing different political tendencies disagreed
49
(often forcefully) about the extent of state sovereign immunity. At
one time it appeared that the legacy of the Southern bond cases
would be limited to preventing judgments against state officers that
50
required drawing money from the state treasury. But this possibility
was negatived in 1996 by the categorical holding in Seminole Tribe of
51
Florida v. Florida: “[T]he relief sought by a plaintiff suing a State is
irrelevant to the question whether the suit is barred by the Eleventh
52
Amendment.”
Seminole Tribe involved what Justice John Paul Stevens aptly
called the “rather curious” provision in the Indian Gaming

46. Id. at 160.
47. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984).
48. Id. (quoting Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 160).
49. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 292 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence as a “hodgepodge” of “ad hoc and unmanageable rules
bearing little or no relation to one another or to any coherent framework”); Halderman, 465
U.S. at 127 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing the majority’s application of Eleventh
Amendment as “perverse”).
50. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 276–77; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974).
51. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
52. Id. at 58.
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Regulatory Act. First, the provision required states to negotiate in
good faith with Indian tribes over the regulation of gambling on their
reservations. Second, the provision authorized the tribes to sue the
53
states in federal court if they did not. The legal issue was whether
Congress could authorize such suits. The majority, in an opinion by
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, held that it could not: “The Eleventh
Amendment prohibits Congress from making the State of Florida
54
capable of being sued in federal court.” For authority the Court
relied on one of the Southern bond cases from 1890, Hans v.
55
Louisiana. In Hans, an in-state plaintiff had sued his own state—the
same case in which the state attorney general had warned the Court
56
concerning the difficulty of enforcing a judgment against the state.
The Court in Hans found as a historical fact that the adoption of the
Eleventh Amendment evidenced an original understanding, broader
than the literal terms of the Amendment, that states were not subject
57
to suit in federal court without their consent. It therefore dismissed
58
the suit for want of jurisdiction. In Seminole Tribe, the plaintiff tribe
had also joined the state’s governor as a defendant, but the majority
rejected this claim, too, inferring that Congress did not contemplate
jurisdiction over a state officer because the legislation prescribed “a

53. Id. at 77 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 76. Despite this sweeping statement, the Chief Justice elsewhere in his opinion
recognized that Congress did have the power to make a state susceptible to suit in federal court
if acting pursuant to its enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 59 (citing
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)).
55. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
56. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 9 (“The question is presented, whether a State can be sued in a
Circuit Court of the United States by one of its own citizens upon a suggestion that the case is
one that arises under the Constitution or laws of the United States.”).
57. See id. at 15 (“Can we suppose that, when the eleventh amendment was adopted, it was
understood to be left open for citizens of a state to sue their own state in the federal courts,
while the idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of foreign states, was indignantly repelled?
. . . The supposition that it would is almost an absurdity on its face.”).
58. I have not discussed the issue of state consent to suit in this paper, although it is
germane to the general issue of federal jurisdiction over states. Despite holding that the
Eleventh Amendment and the associated concept of state sovereign immunity deprive federal
courts of jurisdiction over suits against states, the Supreme Court has consistently held that
federal courts may exercise jurisdiction over suits against states that consent. See, e.g., Coll. Sav.
Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999) (“[A] State
may waive its sovereign immunity by consenting to suit.”). State consent to suit is the unique
instance in which a party may confer jurisdiction on the Court. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 127–28 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[C]onsent of a party is in all other instances
wholly insufficient to create subject-matter jurisdiction where it would not otherwise exist.”).
Since the question here is whether state debts are sovereign, I have limited my remarks to cases
in which consent to suit is denied.
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detailed remedial scheme” in case a state refused to comply.
Justice David Souter, writing on behalf of three other Justices,
filed a long dissenting opinion, extensively reviewing the historical
60
literature. Turning the history lesson against the majority, Justice
Souter wrote that “Hans is so utterly indefensible on the merits of its
legal analysis that one is forced to look elsewhere in order to
61
understand how the Court could have gone so far wrong.”
62
“[H]istory,” he said, “provides the explanation,” and pointed to “the
pattern of the cases, which tends to show that the presence or absence
of enforcement difficulties significantly influenced the path of the law
63
in this area.” Thus, Justice Souter would have limited Hans to cases
brought under the constitutional grant of jurisdiction over suits
involving states and citizens of another state (so-called “citizen-state
64
diversity jurisdiction”). For cases against a state arising under the
65
Constitution (“federal question jurisdiction”), state sovereign
immunity would exist as only a matter of federal common law,
waivable by congressional legislation.
Seemingly irked, Chief Justice Rehnquist responded that the
dissent “disregards our case law in favor of a theory cobbled together
from law review articles and its own version of historical events” and
concluded that “[i]ts undocumented and highly speculative extralegal
explanation of the decision in Hans is a disservice to the Court’s
66
traditional method of adjudication.” While the Chief Justice may

59. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74 (majority opinion). Under the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act, the remedy for failure by a state to negotiate in good faith is an order directing
the state and the tribe to conclude a compact within sixty days. The remedy for failure to
comply with this order is an order that each party submit a proposed compact to a mediator who
selects the one that best embodies the terms of the statute. Finally, the remedy for failure by a
state to accept the compact selected by the mediator is notice to the Secretary of the Interior
who then implements regulations governing gambling on the tribal lands. Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710 (West 2012).
60. The historical literature included (I must admit) my book and later law review article.
See ORTH, supra note 1 (tracing the history of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence); John V.
Orth, The Truth About Justice Iredell’s Dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia, 73 N.C. L. REV. 255
(1994) (discussing misunderstanding and misrepresentation of Justice Iredell’s dissent).
61. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 122 n.17 (Souter, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 120; see also id. at 122 (“[H]istory explains, but does not honor, Hans.”).
63. Id. at 121 n.16.
64. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend . . . to Controversies . . .
between a State and Citizens of another State . . . .”).
65. See id. (“The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority . . . .”).
66. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 68–69; see also Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
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have a point about the explanation being “extralegal,” in the sense
that it is not based on what appears in the U.S. Reports (and perhaps
about its “speculative” nature, based as it is on “the pattern of the
cases”), he overstates his point about the forensic use of history. The
Court in Hans—like the Court in many other constitutional cases—
purported to base its decision on “its own version of historical
67
events.” As Justice Souter justly observed in reply, “[t]his Court’s
opinions frequently make assertions of historical fact,” although he
qualified this observation with the recognition that “these assertions
are not authoritative as to history in the same way that our
68
interpretations of laws are authoritative as to them.”
Although the majority readily acknowledged the historical
context of the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, it refused to
consider the historical context of the decision in Hans. Perhaps this is
what the Chief Justice meant by “the Court’s traditional method of
adjudication.” Although it is characteristic of forensic legal history to
treat historical facts as relevant to the understanding of legal
documents such as statutes or constitutions (or constitutional
amendments), judges tend to treat judicial decisions as ahistorical,
perhaps because to emphasize the particular historical context of a
decision would detract from the appearance of judicial impartiality.
Supreme Court cases are not adjudications of historical fact. (In
this country we are fortunately spared an official history.) Whether or
not the Court in Hans found its version of the past merely a
convenient explanation for dismissing a case it could not handle for
other reasons, the decision it rendered was an interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment—or, rather of Article III of the Constitution, in
light of the Eleventh Amendment. The dissenters in Seminole Tribe
thought Hans was wrong as a matter of constitutional construction. It
is certainly plausible to argue that they found historical arguments
convenient as a way to marginalize a decision with which they

Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 688 (1999) (referring to “the now-fashionable
revisionist accounts of the Eleventh Amendment set forth in other opinions in a degree of
repetitive detail that has despoiled our northern woods”).
67. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 68–69.
68. Id. at 108 n.5 (Souter, J., dissenting). It is also worth noting the riposte by Chief Justice
Appleton of Maine to Chief Justice Taney’s use of history in Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393
(1856): “[W]hatever may be the authoritative force of a decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States, there can be no doubt that its statements, as to the past history of the country, are
binding neither on the historian nor the jurist.” Burton v. Kennebec, 44 Me. 405, 561 (1857).
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disagreed. But it is also plausible to argue that the majority in
Seminole Tribe defended Hans not only as a matter of historical
accuracy and stare decisis but also because it suited their preference
for restricting the reach of federal power over the states. If the
expansive Eleventh Amendment decisions in the Southern state bond
cases were driven by fears of nonenforcement, that fear was surely
absent in Seminole Tribe. The federal court could safely have ordered
Florida to negotiate with the tribe “in good faith” (for whatever good
that would do).
V. MODERN CONSEQUENCES
Because sovereign debts have come to be defined by their legal
enforceability—or, rather, lack thereof—whether American state
debts are “sovereign” depends on whether the creditors can secure an
enforceable judgment in federal court. The U.S. Constitution does not
by its terms generally preclude “suits against states”—quite the
contrary. Instead, state suability depends (as we have seen) on exactly
who is suing the state. The Eleventh Amendment and its associated
doctrines bar the usual plaintiffs seeking to collect state debts: private
investors both domestic and foreign. To that extent, American state
debts are sovereign. But the Eleventh Amendment and associated
69
doctrines do not bar all suits against states, not even all suits to
collect state debts. Other American states have sued debtor states in
70
federal court and won (and collected). And it has never been
doubted that the federal government itself could sue states in federal
71
court. Although states are immune from suit by most plaintiffs, state
officers are not, if necessary to prevent violations of federal
72
constitutional rights. But the sovereign immunity of states (such as it
73
is) does not extend to their political subdivisions. Here the question
is whether the governmental entity is more like a state or a county, a
question that has proved difficult to answer with respect to some of

69. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S 410, 420 n.19 (1979) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment has
not accorded the States absolute sovereign immunity in federal-court actions.”).
70. South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904).
71. United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892); United States v. North Carolina, 136 U.S.
211 (1890); see also Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71 n.14 (reaffirming United States v. Texas).
72. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); see also Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71
n.14 (reaffirming Ex parte Young).
73. See, e.g., Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890); see also N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v.
Chatham County, 547 U.S. 189, 193 (2006) (“[T]his Court has repeatedly refused to extend
sovereign immunity to counties.”).
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the modern commissions and authorities that states have created.
The scars of the struggle over the enforceability of state debts
remain visible today, not only on the jurisdiction of federal courts, but
also on the creditworthiness of Southern states. In North Carolina, for
example, the state constitution adopted in 1971 carries forward a
provision that the General Assembly “shall never . . . assume or pay
any . . . bond . . . issued” between 1868 and 1870 unless payment is
approved “by a majority of all of the qualified voters at a referendum
75
held for that sole purpose.” Lest this embarrassment impair the
state’s current credit rating, the same constitution gives investors in
later issues extraordinary protection. Although the governor has the
duty to maintain a balanced budget by “making necessary economies
in State expenditures,” that duty is subject to the significant proviso
that she must first make “adequate provision for the prompt payment
of the principal of and interest on bonds and notes of the State
76
according to their terms.” Modern bondholders, in other words, are
first in line in case of a revenue shortfall, ahead of school children and
the indigent—probably a necessary proviso in light of the state’s
credit history, but one that the unreformed Ebenezer Scrooge would
doubtless have applauded.

74. See, e.g., Cash v. Granville Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding
that a principal factor in determining the sovereign status of a governmental entity is whether a
judgment against the governmental entity would have to be paid from the state’s treasury).
75. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 3 (4). The original version of this provision dates to a postReconstruction amendment added to the state’s 1868 constitution in 1880 and carried over into
the state’s 1971 constitution. See ORTH, supra note 41, at 123–24.
76. N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5 (3). This provision, requiring a balanced budget, was added to
the state’s 1971 constitution by amendment in 1977. ORTH, supra note 41, at 94–96. Lest this
addition raise doubts about the inviolability of subsequently issued state debt, the provision
expressly preserves the obligation of bonds or notes “issued hereafter.” N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5
(3). The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that taxpayers have standing to challenge a
governor’s actions under this subsection. Goldston v. State, 637 S.E.2d 876 (N.C. 2006). In a
later stage of the same case, the extent of the governor’s power to reallocate appropriated funds
was clarified by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, a decision affirmed by an equally divided
state supreme court. Goldston v. State, 683 S.E.2d 237 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009), aff’d, 700 S.E.2d
223 (N.C. 2010) (affirming the lower-court decision by a divided supreme court and without
precedential value).

